The podcast posted last night addresses the real threats Russian posed by private military companies and some things that can be done to mitigate that threat. I will post some additional references if you are interested in reading more about that.
In summary, we need to be concerned about these Russian sort-of-private and not-quite commercial enterprises. Some of the problems associated with these companies include:
- They are a component of the Russian Hybrid War model, where non-state entities provide training and operation of weapons systems to countries as the first step of establishing firm Russian military presence and control of a developing state.
- The PMC role in hybrid warfare also affects more developed countries. They are also being used in Russia’s near-abroad regions to de-stabilize neighboring democracies, especially when those countries show pro-Western tendencies.
- The presence of Russian PMCs can be assumed to be authorized by the Kremlin, but their activities may not be under the control of the Kremlin. There is also the question of who in the Kremlin is controlling any particular PMC. It is possible that, in the pursuit of securing national resources for the Russian kleptocracy, that they could be used to suppress political opponents or even conduct cross border operations. Because the Russian government has no legal accountability for these organizations under international law. The risk of Russia allowing such activity is very low.
- Because responsibility, accountability, and even authority and control over these organizations is murky, it could delay or inhibit any effective response to acts of aggression by these PMCs.
- The lack of accountability under the law, actions counter to human rights law and the law of war, the deliberate effort by Russia to equate their PMCs with Western PMSCs, and the willingness of Western media to accept this as true can undermine the legitimacy of Western PMSCs and international efforts such as the Montreux Document.
There are things responsible governments can do. These include, but are no means limited to:
- Education and public statements promoting the Montreux Document and the international initiatives that flow from that document.
- Encouraging governments to require PSCs used in that country or which operate from that country to conform to the recognized international standards for private security company operations.
- Assist other governments in fulfilling 2., above.
- Enforce sanctions on Russian PMCs and those who control them. Publicize the sanctions, including citing specific reasons why these persons and entities are under sanction and remain under sanction.
- Consider sanctioning those who use the services by sanctioned PMCs
- Leverage the recent resolution passed by the parliament of the Oragnization of Security Cooperation in Europe on PMSCs. This resolution calls for opening a dialog on PMSCs and including PMSCs in its annual information sharing on member state armed forces.
- Continue to be open and transparent about the use of Western, Montreux-compliant PMSCs
These mutually supporting actions can serve to isolate or contain the spread of Russian quasi-mercenary organizations, weaken their utility as part of Russian Hybrid Warfare, preserve freedom of action for Western governments and Montreux compliant PMSCs, and maybe – just maybe, improve the stability, security, and respect for human rights in fragile states and regions.